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cardiovascular, gastrointestinal and dermatological systems.
While the growing body of evidence of mind and body
interactions is reaching acceptance within mainstream
medicine, the debate as to whether the therapeutic corollary of
these data — whether psychosocial interventions can improve
clinical outcomes in organic disease — continues, with equally
vociferous voices at both ends of the spectrum.6 Psychosocial
interventions also offer a means to modify unhealthy lifestyle
behaviours (such as smoking, poor nutrition and lack of
exercise) which themselves influence illness.10 Furthermore, the
participation of patients in treatment and validation of their
subjective experience, particularly in the face of chronic illness,
will enhance quality of life and offer comfort in the face of
distress, a therapeutically desirable situation whether or not
the intervention influences disease outcome.
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It would appear that tariffs for medical care will forever be a
cause of dispute. Although our patients are by and large
pleased to have our services available for them when needed,
they would much rather not be in such need, and resent paying
for what needs to be done (rather like my approach to the legal
fraternity). On the other hand, I think it was our revered
medical forefather, Hippocrates, who stated that ‘treatment
without payment is not treatment’.
19th century tariffs
In his A History of Medicine in South Africa1 E H Burrows
describes how various medical tariffs were determined in the
Cape Colony during the 19th century.
As Head of the Colonial Medical Department Dr James
Barry negotiated a tariff with the local medical practitioners,
which was published in 1823. A new departure for those days
was that no distinction was made between surgeons and
physicians. Another tariff, negotiated by the practitioners in the
Cape who had formed a ‘vigorous South African Medical
Society’ later replaced Dr Barry’s tariff.
In later years a tariff published in the Transvaal Republic
allowed great latitude in permissible charges, a situation that
was to change quite radically in the 1960s.
20th century tariffs
During the 1930s various large employers negotiated a
preferential tariff (on a fee-per-service basis) for their
employees with the then Medical Association of South Africa
(MASA). The Association determined the content of the tariff
and set the level of the fees. This tariff was based on a 30%
reduction on the fees charged for private patients. Part of this
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agreement was that the tariff would apply only to a certain
proportion of those employees earning above a predetermined
level. This later led to a lot of friction when the Medical
Association became aware of the fact that many of the ‘top
brass’ of a number of companies were availing themselves of
this preferential tariff.
The Medical Schemes Act of 1967
After lengthy and acrimonious negotiations between the
Minister of Health, the Medical Association and the Dental
Association, an Act of Parliament was passed in 1967, ‘To
provide for certain measures for the control and promotion of
medical schemes; for the purpose to establish a Central Council
for Medical Schemes, and to provide for matters incidental
thereto’. This was generally referred to as the Medical Schemes
Act.
This Act differentiated between ‘medical aid schemes’ and
‘medical benefit schemes’, the former in essence catering for a
‘fee-for-service’ system, and the latter for contractual, periodic
remuneration on a per capita basis for services rendered to
members of the schemes, e.g. the Mines Benefit Society and the
South African Railways Medical Benefit Scheme. These latter
were not affected by this Act.
The Representative Association of Medical Schemes (RAMS)
and the Medical and Dental Associations were recognised in
the Act as being bodies with an interest in determining a tariff,
and as such could make representations to the remuneration
commissions which were established in terms of this Act.
Definitions xxi and xxii of the Act referred to a ‘schedule of
relative values’ for services rendered to members of schemes,
and a ‘tariff of fees’. The tariff and its contents were to be
determined by a ‘Remuneration Commission’. The Act made
no mention of the basis on which a tariff was to be determined
by the Remuneration Commission, nor did successive
commissions given any indication as to what their guidelines
were to be, which omission led to much confusion and
acrimony. This lack of an acceptable, agreed-upon basis for
negotiation, which has persisted to the present, has bedevilled
all negiations, be it with the remuneration commissions, RAMS
or with whomsoever we were to negotiate.
During the early 1960s a monumental task was performed,
mainly by Professor Julius Bremer and Mr Jack Wolfowitz, in
establishing the so-called Standard Tariff of Fees. Until very
recently all our tariffs were to a greater or lesser extent based
on their work. Rightly or wrongly, the basis of their approach
was to attempt to set a tariff that  would enable medical
practitioners, working in whatever discipline, to earn a similar
amount of money during their working lives. This so-called
Standard Tariff was the tariff presented to the First
Remuneration Commission as a basis for negotiation. However,
the determination of a Tariff of Fees by successive
remuneration commissions was far below a level regarded as
reasonable and acceptable to the medical and dental
professions. In addition, the list of procedures as presented to
the commissions was amended, resulting in gross distortions of
the relativity of the fees allocated to the various procedures. I
believe that the cumulative effect of all this was to lead to
many of the problems currently facing our profession.
Initially two remuneration commissions sat to determine
the structure and monetary level of the Medical Aid Tariff. The
latter of these two met in 1974. Both the Medical Association
and the Dental Association were grossly dissatisfied with the
findings of these commissions. (Between the sittings of the First
and Fourth Remuneration Commissions, two sittings were held
to deal with technical matters, with no effect on the tariff as a
whole.) These commissions and all subsequent commissions
sat under the chairmanship of the late Mr Justice R Erasmus.
The Medical Association was allowed to nominate one
representative on the commissions. On one occasion our
representative wished to submit a minority report, which was
vetoed by the chairman, with the  result that our representative
refused to sign the report. In terms of the Act, practitioners
could ‘contract in’ or ‘contract out’ of the system. If contracted
in they would be paid directly by medical schemes for services
rendered to their members, at the level set in the tariff. If
contracted out medical aid schemes were forbidden to pay the
practitioner directly, irrespective of what was charged.
The Act was later changed, giving the respective professions
the task of determining a list of procedures with relative unit
values for all procedures, the Remuneration Commission then
to attach a monetary value to the units. The same monetary
value was to apply to all items in the tariff. Whereas previous
tariff lists were based on specialist listings, the new tariff
proposed by the Medical Association attempted to unify the
listings under anatomical headings, thus avoiding numerous
duplications and anomalies that appeared in previous tariffs
(for instance a sigmoidoscopy performed by a physician had a
different monetary value to one done by a surgeon).
Having drawn up this tariff list, MASA decided in good
faith that it would be to everyone’s advantage were they and
RAMS to agree on the economic approach to be made to the
Commission, which was to meet in 1977. To this end a meeting
with RAMS was held (in the Southern Transvaal Branch’s office
in Johannesburg). To our very pleasant surprise we left the
meeting with, as we thought, an agreement that we would
arrange for our economic adviser, Professor J Lombard of
Pretoria University, and their adviser, Professor Botha of the
University of the Witwatersrand to get together and work out a
common economic approach to the Commission. Alas, we were
too naïve and it was not to be. As the time for the sitting of the
Commission approached, we were to discover that they had
reneged on the agreement reached, offering the totally spurious
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argument that the Commission would take exception to our
usurping one of its functions, and we were forced once again to
make our representations to the Commission on an adversarial
basis. Understandably, this soured our relations with the
medical aid representatives for years to come. MASA’s
approach in 1977 was that for practical reasons the findings of
the 1974 Fourth Remuneration Commission would be used as a
benchmark from which to proceed, even though we did not
and could not in any way accept the previous determinations
as being just or reasonable. At no stage during our
representations to the Commission, or those of RAMS, did the
members of the Commission query this approach.
Working from that benchmark, MASA presented the
proposed tariff as described above to the Fifth Remuneration
Commission, which was charged by law with finally
determining the monetary value to be attached to the units as
proposed by MASA. To our dismay and (and, so we were very
reliably informed) that of the advocate representing RAMS, the
Commission decided, without any debate with us, that the
previous (1974) tariff had been too high. They therefore
reduced the monetary value of the units in the tariff and
adjusted the new tariff accordingly. The result was absolutely
disastrous. It led to a total distortion of the relative values, the
monetary value of the whole tariff being reduced uniformly.
The result was that, inter alia, the value for anaesthetics was
reduced by a considerable amount (I think by something like
20%), and that after 4 years of inflation!
Following this debacle, the Medical and Dental Associations
negotiated to have the function of determining a tariff taken
from the Remuneration Commission. The function was
transferred to a very unwilling South African Medical and
Dental Council (SAMDC), whose Tariff Committee attempted,
perhaps unwisely, to rectify the perceived inequities resulting
from the activities of the remuneration commissions in one fell
swoop. This led to the then Minister of Health, in his total lack
of wisdom, having the Act changed once more, giving him the
task of approving or altering the tariff as proposed by the
SAMDC’s Tariff Committee. As was to be expected, this too
had disastrous results.
Subsequently RAMS gained even more recognition in the
Act. ‘Consultation’ was interpreted by them as meaning, ‘have
a chat and then do what we wish’, which it would seem may
be what is now facing the profession once again.
In 1978 I was afforded the opportunity to visit the offices of
the Ontario Medical Association, whose ‘Ontario Tariff’ was at
that time held up to us as a model of how things should be.
However, on enquiring how they managed to obtain unanimity
among the various disciplines, I was informed that war broke
out each year when the tariff had to be adjusted. 
Can we learn anything from what has happened before?
Two generations of medical and dental practitioners in this
country have practised in a system in which an ever-increasing
proportion of their patients are dependent on some form of
medical insurance to enable them to meet the cost of medical
care. Private practice as we know it in this country today could
not survive without medical aids or other forms of medical
insurance in whatever guise, which fact greatly reduces the
profession’s bargaining power, while affording the medical
insurance inordinate leverage in negotiations.
Whereas the initial idea of medical aid societies was that
they would enable their members to afford private medical
care, after the advent of the Medical Schemes Act, which gave
statutory recognition to the Representative Association of
Medical Schemes, the medical aid movement, in the guise of
protecting the public, took it upon itself to interfere with both
the contents as well as the level of tariffs, with what I have
always believed to be a spurious claim, viz. that they were
acting in the best interests of the patients!
At all times we must remember that we practitioners, as
well as all others involved in health care, are eating from the
same ‘cake’, which is always smaller than we would wish,
resulting in so much squabbling among the profession as to
how that cake should be divided.
To quote rather loosely from an address given by Professor
Uwe Reinhardt of one of the Ivy League universities, to the
World Medical Association meeting in Singapore: ‘There is no
answer as to how many doctors a country needs, other than to
say that it depends on how much that country is prepared
and/or able to pay for their services’.
May we hope that the present generation of medical
practitioners will have the gumption to stand up be counted
when faced with challenges to the independence of the
profession, in contrast to what happened during the late 1970s
at which time our members failed the Medical Association
dismally when called upon to confront the gonvernment of the
day over the right to ‘contract out’ under the terms of the
Medical Schemes Act.
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